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ECONOMIC REGULATIONS*
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H. KADisHt

HOSE who have had occasion to look for answers to the problems of
the use of sanctions, taken to include the whole range of official modes
of securing compliance with norms of conduct, have commonly agreed
for some time now that there are few to be found.1 In view of the antiquity
of the legal experience, which for the most part has always entailed the use
of sanctions of one kind or another, this is a remarkable verdict. Indeed, works
written at the turn of the eighteenth century by Jeremy Bentham 2 are still
the basic works in the area, a sobering observation which could scarcely be
made of more than a handful of subjects of inquiry. In this state of affairs it is
not surprising that we are largely ignorant of the impact of the penal sanction,
which is only one aspect of the larger problem of sanctions; and still less so
that we know little about the use of the penal sanction in an area of relatively
recent development, economic regulatory legislation. These are only sectors
of a much larger unexplored terrain.
Moreover, unnecessary confusion has become an ally of ignorance in impeding understanding of these areas. Because strong ideological differences
separate the proponents and opponents of economic regulation, judgments
* This article stems from a talk given at the Conference on Criminal Sanctions and
Enforcement of Economic Regulations, held by The University of Chicago Law School on
May 5, 1962.
t Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.
1 See, e.g., Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.); BENTlAM, THEORY
OF LEGISLATION 358 (2d ed. 1871); FREuND, LEGISLATivE REGULATION 339 (1932); LANDIS,
ThE ADMismsm AxvE PROCESS 89-91 (1938); ARENS & LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC
ORim. 3 (1961).
2 E.g., BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALs AND LEGISLATION (1st ed.

1789).

424

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:423

about the effect of penal sanctions in achieving compliance tend to turn upon
judgments about the merits of the substantive regulation. Liberally oriented
social scientists, otherwise critical of the case made for the deterrent and vindicatory uses of punishment of ordinary offenders, may be found supporting
stern penal enforcement against economic violators. 3 At the same time conservative groups, rarely foes of rigorous punishment for ordinary offenders,
appear less sanguine for the criminal prosecution when punishment of business
4
offenders is debated.
This statement of the undeveloped state of the art is by no means designed
as an introduction to an ambitious effort to close the ancient gap in understanding. Quite the contrary, it is meant rather to excuse the modest ambit
of these observations. What I would like to accomplish is to outline the special
characteristics of economic regulatory legislation relevant to the use of the
criminal sanction; to indicate what implications they have for effective use of
the criminal law; and to suggest relevant concerns in the use of this sanction
beyond the goal of enforcing the specific regulatory norm.
I
The kind of economic regulations whose enforcement through the criminal
sanction is the subject of this inquiry may be briefly stated: those which impose restrictions upon the conduct of business as part of a considered economic policy. This includes such laws as price control and rationing laws,
antitrust laws and other legislation designed to protect or promote competition or prevent unfair competition, export controls, small loan laws, securities
regulations, and, perhaps, some tax laws. Put to one side, therefore, are regulations directly affecting business conduct which are founded on interests other
than economic ones; for example, laws regulating the conduct of business in
the interest of public safety and general physical welfare. Also to one side are
laws indirectly affecting business conduct by their general applicability; for
example, embezzlement, varieties of fraud and related white-collar offenses.
3

BuARNEs & TEmrERs, NEW HORIZONS rN CRIMINoLoGY 43 (3d ed. 1959); CuNARD, THE
BLACK MARKET 243 (1952); SHAW, THE CRIME OF IMPRiSoNMENT 34 (1946); SunmR.AND
& CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 40-47 (5th ed. 1955). Feelings sometimes run high.

See, e.g., Surn-Er.AND, W -rrECOU.AR CRmm 85 (1949): "This change in the economic system from free competition to private collectivism has been produced largely by the efforts
of businessmen. Although they have not acted en masse with a definite intention of undermining the traditional American institutions, their behavior has actually produced this
result."
4 See the statements submitted by the American Bar Association and the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York in Hearingson S. 996, 2252-2255 before the Subcommittee
on Anti-trust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,87th Cong., 1st Sess.
97, 100 (1962). See also the observations of Senator Hruska during the hearings in disapproval of the proposals to tighten criminal penalties. Id.passim. Counsel for the defendants
in the Electrical Equipment cases made the interesting observation: "What is to be served
by prison sentences ? ... If the Government regards prison sentences as a means of deterring
future violations of this type, then it has adopted a penological theory that was discarded
100 years ago." Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1961, p. 15, col. 3 (midwest ed.).
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The class of regulations so defined possesses several characteristics that
have a direct bearing upon the uses and limits of the criminal sanction as a
means of achieving compliance. The first is the very feature suggested as the
identifying characteristic of such legislation; that is, the nature of the interest
protected. Certainly the use of criminal sanctions to protect interests of an
economic character is not a contemporary departure. The extension of the
classic larceny offense by courts and legislatures to embrace fraud, embezzlement and similar varieties of misappropriation that threatened newly developing ways of transacting business is a well documented chapter in the history
of the criminal law.5 Indeed the process continues today. 6 But there is an important difference between the traditional and expanded property offenses
and the newer economic regulatory offenses-a difference reflecting the shift
from an economic order that rested on maximum freedom for the private entrepreneur to one committed to restraints upon that freedom. The traditional
property offenses protect private property interests against the acquisitive behavior of others in the furtherance of free private decision. 7 The newer offenses,
on the other hand, seek to protect the economic order of the community
against harmful use by the individual of his property interest. The central
purpose, therefore, is to control private choice, rather than to free it. But the
control imposed (and this too has significance) is not total, as it would be in
a socialistic system. Private economic self-determination has not been abandoned in favor of a wholly state regulated economy. Indeed, the ideal of free
enterprise is maintained, the imposed regulations being regarded as necessary
to prevent that ideal from consuming itself.8 Whether the criminal sanction
may safely and effectively be used in the service of implementing the largescale economic policies underlying regulatory legislation of this kind raises
fundamental questions.
A second relevant feature of these laws concerns the nature of the conduct
restrained. Since it is not criminal under traditional categories of crime and,
apart from the regulatory proscription, closely resembles acceptable aggressive business behavior, the stigma of moral reprehensibility does not naturally
s E.g., HALL, Tn-sFr, LAW AND SocIETY (2d ed. 1952).
6 Compare People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246,267 P.2d 271 (1954), with Chaplin v. United
States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See MODEL PENAL CODE app. A at 103 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1953).
7 Cf. HuRsT, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 21 (1956): "Characteristically,

nineteenth century criminal and tort law involved not only limitations in the interest of
free private decision, but also positive regulations looking to that end. Criminal law extended
its reach in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nowhere more conspicuously than in
the law of theft. Growth of the law concerning embezzlement, theft by bailees, and the receipt
of stolen goods went along with the expansion of the market economy; increased dealings
at a distance, in reliance on others, and in volume created an impersonality of dealing which

called for more intervention by law to secure the working minimum of reliable conduct."
8

See id. ch. Impassim.
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associate itself with the regulated conduct.9 Moreover, the conduct is engaged
in by persons of relatively high social and economic status; since it is motivated by economic considerations, it is calculated and deliberate rather than
reactive; it is usually part of a pattern of business conduct rather than episodic
in character; and it often involves group action through the corporate form.
The third noteworthy attribute of this legislation is the role provided for
the criminal sanction in the total scheme of enforcement. Typically the criminal penalty is only one of a variety of authorized sanctions which may
include monetary settlements, private actions (compensatory or penal), injunctions, inspections, licensing, required reporting or others. Its role, therefore, is largely ancillary and takes either or both of two forms. On the one
hand, the criminal penalty may serve as a means to insure the functioning
of other sanctions, as, for example, penalties for operating without a license,
or without prior registration or reporting. On the other hand, the criminal
sanction may serve as a separate and supplementary mode of enforcement by
directly prohibiting the conduct sought to be prevented, as in the Sherman Act. Furthermore, implicit in the legislative scheme is the conception
of the criminal sanction as a last resort to be used selectively and discriminatingly when other sanctions fail. The array of alternative non-penal sanctions appears unmistakably to carry this message. That this is assumed by
enforcement authorities is apparent from the relative infrequency of the use
of the criminal as compared to other sanctions,10 and in the occasional appearance of published criteria of enforcement policy." And in some legislation, of course, the message of selective enforcement is explicit in the law.12
Finally, the responsibility for investigation, detection and initiating prosecution is often vested in a specialized agency or other body rather than left
with the usual institutions for policing and prosecuting criminal violations.
Moreover, these bodies, such as the Office of Price Administration during the
war, or the Securities and Exchange Commission, commonly are not special9 But see SurTnmLAND, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45.
10
See C_ NARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 238; Newman, White Collar Crime, 23 LAW &

CoerEp. PROB. 735, 739 (1958). See the data in SuTHERLAND, op. cit. supranote 3, at 22,
on the relative use of criminal and civil sanctions in his sample of seventy corporations.
For an account of the relative use of the criminal prosecution under the antitrust laws,
see Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. Rzv. 929, 948 (1961)
(appendix).

11 See, e.g., the provisions of the OPA Manual reproduced in DEssIoN, CRnNmqA LAw
ADmINIsTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER 198 (1948), entitled, "General Policies and Standards in

the Selection of the Criminal Sanction." See also the statement of the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division in ATr'V G N. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP.
350 (1955).
12 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug and CosmeticAct § 306,52 Stat. 1045 (1938), 21 U.S.C.
§ 336 (1961): "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the Secretary to report

for prosecution.. . minor violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the public
interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning."
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ized organs of criminal enforcement, but are the agencies broadly charged
with administering the legislative scheme.
This statement of the relevant features of the laws under inquiry, in terms
of the interest protected, the behavior regulated and the contemplated role
of the criminal penalty, is not meant to suggest that these laws are ultimately
unique in the problems they raise for criminal enforcement. Apart from the
nature of the interest protected, most, if not all, of these characteristics may
be found in other areas of the criminal law: upper-class criminality in whitecollar crime generally; selectivity in enforcement in the whole range of the
criminal law, to a greater or lesser degree; deliberate, patterned conduct for
gain engaged in by organizations in many other classes of offenses. And even
though the nature of the interest protected is by definition unique, many of
the problems it poses, such as making criminal morally neutral behavior, are
common to other areas as well. All that is suggested is that if one asks, "What
problems are raised for the effective use of the criminal sanction as a mode
of achieving compliance in this area?" the beginnings of an answer are to
be found in this congeries of characteristics. It remains now to suggest what
bearing they have.
I propose to deal with the relevance of these characteristics in terms of three
major problems: the problem of defining the proscribed conduct, the problem
of corporate criminality and the problem of moral neutrality.
A. The Problem of Defining the ProscribedConduct
The fact that the protected interest is the preferred functioning of the economic system, and entails only partial restriction upon the operation of American business, bears directly upon the task of defining the proscribed behavior
with sufficient specificity to meet the requirement of fair notice generally
applicable to criminal legislation. Where the criminal sanction is used to
police other enforcement devices, as for example, when it becomes criminal
to market a security issue without registration or to do business without a
license, the standard is met without difficulty. But the requirement of specificity is notably difficult of fulfillment where the crime itself purports to define the
substantive economic behavior sought to be avoided. A notable example is
the Sherman Act's prohibition of "restraint of trade or commerce" and "illegal monopolization."1 3 Only to a small degree, if at all, is the difficulty remediable by better draftsmanship. As Thurman Arnold observed, "antitrust
policy touches fields and boundaries which recede as you approach them and
disappear each time you try to stake them out."14 The reason for this arises
from several sources. First, the economic policy is itself unclear, constituting
13 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
14Quoted in Cahill, Must We Brand American Business by Indictment as Criminal?,1952
A.B.A. SECTION ON ANTrIRusr LAw, 26, 30 n.5.
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largely a vague aspiration for a proper balance among competing economic
goals.15 Second, illegality must turn on judgments that are essentially evaluative in character, rather than upon purely factual determinations. Third,
the inevitable development of novel circumstances and arrangements in the
dynamic areas under regulation would soon make precise formulations
obsolete, even to the limited extent they proved feasible.16
A key question is whether what would be an intolerable vagueness in conventional crime is less objectionable here in view of the preventive character
of these laws. But deferring this question for the moment, are there alternatives for meeting the difficulty short of eschewing criminal sanctions where
the conduct cannot be defined with acceptable specificity?
The requirement in an otherwise unconstitutionally vague definition of
criminal conduct that the defendant must be shown to have acted willfully
or knowingly has sometimes been held to remedy the defect of definition.
Thus the Supreme Court found no unfairness in convicting a motor company
for failing to reroute their explosive-laden truck "as far as practical, and where
feasible" to avoid congested areas, where it was necessary to prove that this
was done "knowingly";17 or in convicting a taxpayer for attempting to evade
taxes by making "unreasonable" deductions for commissions paid to stock8
holders as compensation for service, where the action was taken "willfully."'
A requirement that the defendant have intentionally committed the act with
a full and correct understanding of the factual circumstances is of no help to
a defendant faced with an unclear definition of the conduct forbidden. On
the other hand, however vague the line between what is permissible and what
is criminal, where the actor is aware that his conduct falls squarely within the
forbidden zone he is in no position to complain.19 "A mind intent upon willful
evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence." 20 Apparently, therefore, it
is scienter in this sense, that is, knowledge by the actor that he is violating
the law, which is held in these cases to eliminate the vagueness problem. Yet
this premise probably affords defenses to a larger group than intended, since
a defendant who knew nothing of the existence of the law would be in as good
21
a position as one who did not know that his action came within its terms.
15
Jackson & Dumbaud, Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 231, 237 (1938):
"lit must be confessed that there is no consistent or intelligible policy embodied in our
law by which public officials and businessmen may distinguish bona fide pursuit of industrial efficiency from an illicit program of industrial empire building." See id. at 232, quoting
Senator Wagner: "Half of the laws enacted by Congress represent one school of thought,
the other half another. No one can state authoritatively what our national policy is."
16 MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SocIL4, REcoNsrucrnON 159 (1946).
1
7 Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
Is United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
19 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1945).
20
United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942).
21 Cf. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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If the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew his conduct fell within
the terms of the law, it could hardly do so without proof as well that he knew
of its existence. A legislature, however, could presumably resolve the semantic
impasse by making it a defense that the defendant did not know his acts fell
within its terms, or perhaps, more narrowly, that he could not reasonably
know it, though not a defense simply that he did not know of the law's
existence. 22
Another approach to mitigating the difficulties of a vague formulation is
through administrative choice of cases to prosecute. If the enforcenent agency
initiates criminal prosecution solely where the meaning of the stahte has
become acceptably clear through judicial interpretation, the unfairness of the
original unclarity may be thought adequately reduced. An example is the
announced policy of the Department of Justice to institute criminal prosecutions for Sherman Act violations only where there is a per se violation, such as
price fixing, a violation accompanied by a specific intent to restrain competition or monopolize, the use of predatory practices, or where the defendant
has before been convicted of a Sherman Act violation. 23 This approach,
unlike the legislative requirement of scienter, is of no avail where the vagueness of the statutory formulation renders the law constitutionally unenforceable. It is also dependent upon the existence of means other than criminal
prosecutions to develop clarifying interpretation. In the Sherman Act this
is provided through the civil suit as a parallel means of enforcing the identical
standard of conduct. This, in turn, however, may be a mixed blessing. One
of the purposes of looseness and generality in the formulation of the standard
is to create a flexibility that will allow judicial interpretation to keep pace with
the changes in the character of the area under regulation. Courts may prove
understandably reluctant to sustain expansive, although desirable, interpretations where the consequence will be to subject defendants to criminal as well
as civil sanctions.
There are several alternatives to civil litigation as a means of producing
clarifying interpretation. The most obvious is to delegate to the responsible
administrative agency the authority to issue so-called "legislative regulations"
in implementation of the statutory scheme.24 Providing criminal penalties for
22 Of course, a legislature might decide as well to require knowledge or reason to know
of the law or regulation. The reason would not involve the vagueness of the definition, but
rather the failure of the nature of the conduct forbidden to give notice. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
23
Statement of Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division in ATr'y
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANrrRusv RaP. 350 (1955).

24 1 DAVIS, ADmmNISRATm'B LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958). See id. at 358: "A legislative

rule is the product of an exercise of legislative power by an agency, pursuant to a grant
(whether explicit or not) of legislative power by the legislative body; a court will no more
substitute judgment on the content of a valid legislative rule than it will substitute judgment
on the content of a valid statute. A legislative rule is valid if it is (a) within the granted power,
(b)issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable."
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violations of these regulations 2S then eliminates the vagueness problem to the
extent of the clarity of the regulation. 26 There is still, to be sure, a requirement
of some specificity in the legislative standard from which the agency derives
its authority. But this raises the different, though related, issue of delegation
of powers, where requirements of specificity are considerably less than those
applicable to criminal statutes.2 7 The declaratory order, in which the agency
renders an advisory judgment on the legality of a contemplated course of
action, is another possibility. This has utility both in providing further clarification of the applicability of regulations and in rendering interpretive guidance
of the law when it, rather than a regulation, is the direct source of the prohibition. Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act 28 provides a precedent
for such an order, although the use authorized therein is considerably more
limited than it might be.29
Still another alternative is flatly to prohibit certain kinds of activity, except
where an administrative agency, interpreting and applying general legislative
standards, expressly allows it, as by issuing a license. The criminal penalty
may then be imposed for the clearly defined offense of engaging in the activity
without authorization. 30 This, of course, is to use the criminal sanction, as
previously suggested, as a means of enforcing another, non-criminal sanction.
It is readily usable in such narrow areas as marketing securities, or engaging
in other particular types of business. It is impractical where the thrust of the
prohibition goes to ways of conducting any and all kinds of business, as in
the Sherman Act.
B. The Problem of Corporate Criminality
Conduct reached by economic regulatory legislation is typically group conduct often engaged in through the corporate form. This raises the formidable
issue of corporate criminality. From the legislative viewpoint, the principal
questions are twofold. First, what difficulties beset enforcement agencies in
affixing criminal liability upon responsible actors where the principal violator
is the corporation? Second, in any event, what are the possibilities of effective
enforcement through the imposition of criminal penalties upon the corporation itself?
Fixing criminal liability upon the immediate actors within a corporate
structure generally poses no spdcial problem. 31 But the immediate actors may
25 Since United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), there has been no doubt of the
constitutionality of such provisions.
26

See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (Reed, 3., dissenting).

27 See 1 DAvis, op. cit. supranote 24, § 2.03.
28 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
29
See GnusoRN & BysE, ADMmN
Aav LAW 700 (1960).
30 Cf. WU.AMs, CRIMINAL LAW 579 (2d ed. 1961).

31 But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5), comment at 155 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), for

a discussion of diffculties encountered in some jurisdictions.
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be lower echelon officials or employees who are the tools rather than the
responsible originators of the violative conduct. Where the corporation is
managed by its owners, the task of identifying the policy formulators is not
acute. But where the stock of the corporation is widely held, the organization
complex and sprawling, and the responsibility spread over a maze of departments and divisions, then, as has recently been shown, 32 there may be conspicuous difficulties in pin-pointing responsibility on the higher echelon policymaking officials. The source of the difficulty is the conventional requirement
that to hold one person criminally liable for the acts of another he must have
participated in the acts of the other in some meaningful way, as by directing
or encouraging them, aiding in their commission 33 or permitting them to be
done by subordinates whom he has power to control. 34 The difficulty is
exemplified in the now famous antitrust prosecution of the electrical equipment manufacturers. Here the high policy makers of General Electric and
other companies involved escaped personal accountability for a criminal conspiracy of lesser officials that extended over several years to the profit of the
corporations, despite the belief of the trial judge and most observers that
these higher officials either knew of and condoned these activities or were willfully ignorant of them.35
It cannot be known to what extent this legal obstacle to convicting the
policy initiators actually reduces the efficacy of the criminal sanction in achieving compliance. Certainly, it would prove more significant in those areas, like
antitrust, where giant corporations are the principal targets of the law, than
in areas where they are not. But other factors may be more influential in
preventing widescale successful prosecution of individual corporate officials;
under the antitrust laws, for example, there have been strikingly few convictions of corporate officials, even of officials of closely held corporations and
36
the lesser officials of large, public corporations.
At all events, one means of reducing the difficulty would be to alter by
statute the basis of accountability of corporate directors, officers or agents.
An amendment, for example, of the antitrust law was recently proposed which
would have changed the present basis of accountability (that such persons
32

33

See Whiting, supra note 10, at 931; Note, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 291 (1961).
For discussion of the principles of complicity, see MODEL PENAL CODE §2.04, comment

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
34
WLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 360.
35
Judge Ganey observed during sentencing: "[O]ne would be most naive indeed to
believe that these violations of the law, so long persisted in, affecting so large a segment of
the industry and finally, involving so many millions upon millions of dollars, were facts
unknown to those responsible for the conduct of the corporation ..... N.Y. Times, Feb.

7, 1961. p. 26, col. 3. See Watkins, ElectricalEquipment Antitrust Cases-TheirImplications
for Government andfor Business, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 97, 106 (1961).
36
See the discussion of the record of convictions in Whiting, supranote10, at 942; Note,
71 YA E L.J. 280, 291 (1961).
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"shall have authorized, ordered or done" the acts) to make it suffice that
the individual had knowledge or reason to know of the corporate violation
and failed to exercise his authority to stop or prevent it.38 This falls short of
outright vicarious liability since accountability is made to turn on fault in
not knowing and acting rather than on a relationship simpliciter. Essentially
it makes a negligent omission the basis of accountability. Still a standard
of accountability resting on precisely how much of the far-flung operations
of a nation-wide corporation an official should reasonably be aware of approaches vicarious liability in its indeterminateness, since neither the common
experience of the jury nor even specialized experience affords substantial
guidance. In effect, it introduces an element of uncertainty concerning accountability into laws that often, like the Sherman Act, are already marked
by uncertainty concerning the conduct forbidden.39
I defer to a later point the issue of whether such scruples are appropriate
in business offenses. 40 To the extent they are, a possible alternative is the
legislative formulation of rules and standards of accountability. Where state
regulatory laws are involved this might be accomplished through amendment
of the corporation laws to fix the lines of accountability in intra-corporate
relationships compatibly with the needs of an effective system of regulation.
The problem, however, arises principally with national regulatory laws sought
to be applied to officials of large interstate corporations. Professor Watkins
has long suggested a federal incorporation law to restore responsibility in such
corporate structures by eliminating the diverse and confusing lines of accountability under state corporation laws. 41 If, as he suggests, the problem of fixing
accountability is due neither to the complexity of business nor to willful attempts to baffle outsiders, but rather to "the absence of uniform standards and
rules for delegation of authority in these huge corporations in which nobody
appears to know who is responsible for what," 42 there may be no just means
for meeting the problem short of his proposal. On the other hand, the complexity of the task and the further inroad into an area of traditional local
jurisdiction might not be regarded as worth the cost, since the legal standards
of accountability may prove to be only one of several factors, and not neces37 Clayton Act § 14, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
38 S.2254, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
39 The difficulty is aggravated where, as in the Sherman Act, knowledge of the law is
not necessary. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
40
See SurumuAm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 54: "The customary plea of the executives
of the corporation is that they were ignorant of and not responsible for the action of the
special department. This plea is akin to the alibi of the ordinary criminal and need not be
taken seriously."
41 Watkins, Federal Incorporation,17 MicH. L. REv. 64, 145, 238 (1918-19); Watkins,
supra note 35, at 108-09.
42 Watkins, supra note 35, at 107-08.
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sarily the most crucial, as we will see, militating against enforcement through
conviction of corporate officials.
Fixing criminal liability upon the corporation itself has posed fewer legal
obstacles in the enforcement of regulatory legislation. The earlier conceptual
difficulties of ascribing criminal intent to a fictitious entity have been largely
removed by the developing law. And whatever doubt may exist is readily met
by expressly providing for corporate liability in the regulatory statute. 43 But
the problem of corporate accountability-that is, when the entity is liable for

conduct of its agents at various levels of responsibility-is analogous to the
problem of holding corporate officials accountable for the acts of lesser agents.
It has been resolved more sweepingly in the case of the entity. For acts of its

high managerial agents it is by definition accountable since a corporation
cannot act by itself. For the acts of its lesser agents the tendency has been,
at least in the regulatory offenses, to hold the corporation accountable for the

acts of employees within the scope of their employment 44 or while acting as
employees. 45 Whether the consequential imposition of vicarious responsibility
upon the corporate entity, as well as upon shareholders, is justified raises the
question of the deterrent efficacy of convicting and fining the corporate entity.

The case for corporate criminality rests presumably upon the inadequacy
of the threat of personal conviction upon the individual actors. As said earlier,
difficulties of proof under legal principles of accountability have interfered
with effective prosecution of high corporate officials. And the commonly
observed jury behavior of convicting the corporate defendant while acquitting
the individual defendants, even where proof is apparently strong, further
supports the case for the alternate sanction. 4 6 Moreover, "there are probably
cases in which the economic pressures within the corporate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard personal liability for the sake of
company gain, especially where the penalties threatened are moderate and
43 Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1, 2, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 7 (1958);
Federal Trade Commission Act § 14, added by 52 Stat. 115 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 54 (1958); Filled Milk Act § 3, 42 Stat. 1487 (1923), 21 U.S.C. § 63 (1958); Meat Inspection
Act, 34 Stat. 1264 (1907), 21 U.S.C. § 88 (1958); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
§§201(e), 303, 52 Stat. 1041, 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(e), 333 (1958).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); New York
Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909); United States v. George
F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1946); People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield FarmsSlawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 29-30, 121 N.E. 474, 476 (1918); State v. Dried Milk
Prods. Co-op, 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W.2d 412, 414-15 (1962).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1938); United
States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. ThompsonPowell Drilling Co., 196 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Tex. 1961); Regan v. Kroger Grocery
& Baking Co,, 386 Ill. 284, 303-07, 54 N.E.2d 210, 219-20 (1944).
46 Though not necessarily, since it can not be known whether juries would have convicted
the individuals if they could not have convicted the entity. For a collection of cases in which
the individual corporate agents were acquitted but the corporation convicted, see Note, 71
YALE L.J. 280, 292 n.50 (1961).
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where the offense does not involve behavior condemned as highly immoral
by the individual's associates." 47 Yet the question remains of the effectiveness
of corporate criminality as a supplementary deterrent.
The only two practically available modes of imposing criminal sanctions
upon the corporate defendant are through the stigma of conviction and the
exaction of a fine. The former, classified by Bentham as the "moral or popular" sanction, operates as he suggested through the adverse reactions to the
conviction of persons in the community. 48 Whether there is any substantial
moral opprobrium attached to violation of economic regulatory legislation
(even where individuals are convicted) I defer until later. Assuming there is,
can it be said to have any appreciable significance when directed to a corporate entity? There is no substantial empirical basis for answering this question.49 It seems unlikely that whatever moral stigma may attach to a convicted corporation would be felt in any effectual way by the corporate individuals, especially in large corporations where responsibility is diffused.50 On
the other hand, the point has been made5l (though denied as'well)52 that the
corporate stigma may operate as a deterrent by impairing the reputation of
the corporation in its business operations and hence adversely affecting its
economic position. Until there is more to go on one can only guess at the
validity of this observation, though there is reason to expect that the impact
of the conviction would operate differentially, depending on the size of the
corporation, the extent of competition and the dominance of its market position, the degree to which its conviction attracted public notice, and the like.
The exaction of a corporate fine serves in part to give color to the moral
stigma of conviction. Insofar as this is its role, its value depends upon the
existence and power of the stigma to deter. On the other hand, the use of the
corporate fine apart from the stigma of conviction raises no issue peculiar to
the criminal sanction, since civil fines afford identical deterrent possibilities.
Whether it would prove effective to increase the economic hazard of misconduct by authorizing higher fines than those now commonly authorized53
47

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
BENTHAm, op. cit. supranote 2, at 25 (Oxford ed. 1907).
49
Experience has varied. The OPA apparently doubted the use of corporate convictions.
Its Manual stated: "Criminal prosecution against a corporation is rather ineffective unless
one or more of the individuals is also proceeded against." See DassroN, op. cit. supranote
11, at 200. Until the recent Electrical Equipment cases (which may be in a class by themselves) the Department of Justice appeared for several years to favor a policy of prosecuting
corporate defendants alone. See Kramer, CriminalProsecutionsfor Violations of the Sherman
Act: In Search of a Policy, 48 GEo. L.. 530, 539 (1960).
50
See ARnNs & LAsswELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121-22; Kramer, supranote 49, at
539-40.
51 See FREDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIET 196 (1959); WurAMs, op. cit. supra
note 30, at 863-64.
53 Id. at 285-86.
52 Note, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 287 n.35 (1961).
48
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depends on such considerations as the general ability of the corporation to
recoup its losses through its pricing policy54 and the likelihood that courts
would impose the higher fines. 55 An alternative recently proposed would
substitute for the fine a governmental proceeding designed to compel the corporation to disgorge the profits attributable to its violation.5 6 These alternatives raise substantial questions concerning sanctions, but not the criminal
sanction, strictly speaking.
C. The Problem of Moral Neutrality
Viewed in the large, the characteristic of the conduct typically proscribed
by economic regulatory legislation most relevant for the purposes of criminal
enforcement is that it is calculated and deliberative and directed to economic
gain.5 7 It would appear, therefore, to constitute a classic case for the operation
of the deterrent strategy. Nonetheless, it is a widely shared view that the strategy has not worked out in fact, that the criminal sanction has not proved a
major weapon for achieving compliance. Part of the explanation may be
attributable to the difficulties of enforcement suggested above, such as the
resistance to vaguely defined standards of criminality, the difficulty of fixing
culpability upon high corporate officials, and the muffled and absorbable
impact of corporate criminal sanctions. But it is likely that other factors play
a more dominant role.
A common explanation of the failure of the criminal sanction is simply that
the powerful business interests affected do not want these laws enforced and
employ their power and position in American life to block vigorous enforcement. Influence is exercised over the legislatures to keep enforcement staffs
impoverished and sanctions safely inefficacious. Enforcement officials, as
prospective counsel for business interests, and judges as former counsel, identify with these interests and resist criminal enforcement. Moreover, news media,
under the control of these same groups, work to create hostility to these laws
and their vigorous enforcement and sympathy for the violators. In short,
"those who are responsible for the system of criminal justice are afraid to
antagonize businessmen ....The most powerful group in medieval society
secured relative immunity from punishment by 'benefit of clergy,' and now
our most powerful group secures relative immunity by 'benefit of business.' "58
It would be dogmatic to assert that influences of this kind do not exist, but
54 Compare Wnuims, op. cit. supra note 30, at 864, with Note, 71 YAE L.J. 280, 285

n.17 (1961).
55 It has been pointed out, for example, in opposition to a move to increase the fine for
antitrust violations, that the fines actually imposed tend to be substantially lower than the

authorized maximum. See Statement of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
in Hearings,supra note 4, at 100.
56 Note, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 297 (1961).
57 But see Lane, Why BusinessMen Violate the Law, 44 J. Clnu.
s8 SuTHEIAND, WHn COLLAR CRam 46-47 (1949).

L., C. & P.S. 151 (1953).
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it may be doubted that they play a dispositive role. Business surely constitutes
a powerful interest group in American life; but the profusion of regulatory
legislation over the ardent protests of important economic interests in the past
thirty years is some evidence that it is not all-powerful. Opposing forces have
been able to marshal considerable public sentiment against a variety of business practices. Moreover, it is perhaps an oversimplification to identify all
business as united in monolithic opposition. There is less a single business
interest than a substantial variety of business interests. What then, in addition
to business propaganda and influence, has accounted for the failure of the
criminal sanction? Or, if we must have a villain, how has it been that business,
which has not always gotten its way, has been this successful in devitalizing
the use of that sanction?
It is a plausible surmise that the explanation is implicated in another feature
of the behavior regulated by these laws; namely, that it is not generally
regarded as morally reprehensible in the common view, that, indeed, in some
measure it is the laws themselves that appear bad, or at least painful necessities,
and that the violators by and large turn out to be respectable people in the
respectable pursuit of profit. It is not likely that these popular attitudes are
wholly products of a public-relations campaign by the affected business community. The springs of the public sentiment reach into the national ethos,
producing the values that the man of business himself holds, as well as the
attitude of the public toward him and his activities. Typically the conduct
prohibited by economic regulatory laws is not immediately distinguishable
from modes of business behavior that are not only socially acceptable, but
affirmatively desirable in an economy founded upon an ideology (not denied
by the regulatory regime itself) of free enterprise and the profit motive. Distinctions there are, of course, between salutary entrepreneurial practices and
those which threaten the values of the very regime of economic freedom. And
it is possible to reason convincingly that the harms done to the economic
order by violations of many of these regulatory laws are of a magnitude that
dwarf in significance the lower-class property offenses. 59 But the point is that
these perceptions require distinguishing and reasoning processes that are not
the normal governors of the passion of moral disapproval, and are not dramatically obvious to a public long conditioned to responding approvingly to the
production of profit through business shrewdness, especially in the absence
of live and visible victims. Moreover, in some areas, notably the antitrust
laws, it is far from clear that there is consensus even by the authors and enforcers of the regulation-the legislators, courts and administrators-on precisely what should be prohibited and what permitted, and the reasons there59 Id. at 13: "Many of the white collar crimes attack the fundamental principles of the
American institutions. Ordinary crimes, on the other hand, produce little effect on social
institutions or social organization." See also M NHEw, op. cit. supra note 16, at 150, 152,
172-73 (1946); Newman, White Collar Crime,23 LAw & Conin". PROB. 734,744 (1958).
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for.60 And as Professor Freund observed, "if a law declares a practice to be

criminal, and cannot apply its policy with consistency, its moral effect is
necessarily weakened."61
The consequences of the absence of sustained public moral resentment for
the effective use of the criminal sanction may be briefly stated. The central

distinguishing aspect of the criminal sanction appears to be the stigmatization
of the morally culpable. 62 At least it tends so to be regarded in the community.
Without moral culpability there is in a democratic community an explicable
and justifiable reluctance to affix the stigma of blame. 6 3 This perhaps is the
basic explanation, rather than the selfish machinations of business interests,
for the reluctance of administrators and prosecutors to invoke the criminal
sanction, the reluctance of jurors to find guilt and the reluctance of judges to
impose strong penalties. 64 And beyond its effect on enforcement, the absence
of moral opprobrium interferes in another more subtle way with achieving

compliance. Fear of being caught and punished does not exhaust the deterrent
mechanism of the criminal law. It is supplemented by the personal disinclination to act in violation of the law's commands, apart from immediate fear of
being punished.65 One would suppose that especially in the case of those who
normally regard themselves as respectable, proper and law-abiding the appeal
to act in accordance with conscience is relatively great. But where the violation
is not generally regarded as ethically reprehensible, either by the community
at large or by the class of businessmen itself, the private appeal to conscience
is at its minimum and being convicted and fined may have little more impact
66
than a bad selling season.
60
6

See note 15 supra. See also MANNIm,

op. cit. supra note 16, at 168.

1FEuND,LEGISLATIW REGULATON 253 (1932).

62

See Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404 (1958).
MANM, op. cit. supra note 16, at 167-68 (1946): "Emile Durkheim has pointed
out that 'the only common characteristic of all crimes is that they consist... in acts universally disapproved of by members of each society... crime shocks sentiments which, for
a given social system, are found in all healthy consciences.' Although this requirement of
universal disapproval may appear somewhat exaggerated, there can be no doubt that without
the backing of at least the major part of the community criminal legislation, in a democracy,
63

must fail."

64 Id. at 5.
65
Fuller, Morals and the CriminalLaw, 32 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 624, 629-30 (1942):
"Ultimately the problem is one of supplementing the political sanctions of the law, which
operate through threat of punishment more or less externally on individuals, with spontaneous moral sanctions which operate on the habits, attitudes, and consciences of individuals."
See Andrenaes, GeneralPrevention-Illusionor Reality, 43 J. CuM. L., C. & P.S. 176, 179
(1952); Sellin, Culture Conflict and Crime, 44 AM. J.oF SocIoLoGY 97 (1938).
66
Inhis study of OPA regulation Clinard concluded that punishment was largely ineffective beyond causing businessmen to adopt shrewd manipulative evasions. He concluded that
control required "the voluntary compliance with the regulations of society by the vast
majority of the citizens." CLwARD, Ta BLAcK MARicr 261 (1952). See VOLD, THEoREtCAL

CRBNOLOGy 257 (1958).
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Are there modes of dealing with these consequences of making morally
neutral behavior criminal? A commonly suggested remedy for inadequate
enforcement is a campaign of strict enforcement aided by strengthened prosecution staffs, and perhaps more severe penalties. 67 But to the extent that the
deficiency in enforcement is attributable to the moral inoffensiveness of the
behavior, the major limitation of such a call to arms is that it is addressed
to the symptom rather than the cause. How will legislatures be convinced to
expend substantial sums for criminal enforcement, or prosecutors to go for
the jugular, or courts or juries to cooperate in the face of a fundamental
lack of sympathy for the criminal penalty in this area? Enlarged resources for
prosecution may well afford staff enthusiasts an opportunity for more vigorous
enforcement, but one may doubt that it can achieve more than a minor flurry
of enforcement. 68
An attack on the cause, insofar as moral neutrality is the cause, would
presumably require a two-pronged program: one directed at the obstacle of
popular nullification; the other at inculcating the sentiment of moral disapproval in the community. 69 Each, of course, would inevitably have an effect
upon the other. The former might proceed, not simply by allocating greater
enforcement resources, but by arrangements that would reduce the traditional
discretionary authority of the various bodies involved in criminal law enforcement. For example, the decision to prosecute might be exclusively centered
in the agency responsible for the whole regulatory program; conservative legal
interpretation might be dealt with by authorizing agency interpretative regulations which are made relevant in criminal prosecutions;70 the temporizing of
juries might be avoided by eliminating, where possible, jury trials; the judge's
sentencing discretion might be curtailed by mandatory minimum penalties. 7'
There is, of course, the substantial task of persuading legislatures to abjure
the traditional mediating institutions of the criminal law in an area where, the
moral factor being largely absent, they might be thought to have their historic
and most useful function to perform. But if enacted, one might reasonably
suppose that such legal arrangements could result in a somewhat more frequent and rigorous use of the criminal sanction and a heightening of the
deterrent effect of the law.
67

See note 3 supra.

short lived Thurman Arnold era of vigorous criminal antitrust enforcement is a
case in point. See Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past andFuture, 7 LAw & CoNTEM.
PROB. 5 (1940). "Mhe record of enforcement shows that the high water mark for criminal
antitrust suits occurred during the 1938-1944 period when, of a total of 385 suits brought
by the Department, 251 or over two-thirds, were criminal prosecutions." Whiting, Antitrust
and the CorporateExecutive, 47 VA. L. Rnv. 929, 940 n.43 (1961).
69
See Fuller, supranote 65, at 624.
70
See text accompanying notes 24-29 sup ra.
71 A bill was introduced to amend the Sherman Act so to provide in certain situations.
S. 2253, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
68 The
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The other prong of the program, the cultivation of the sentiment of moral
disapproval, is perhaps closer to the heart of the matter. To some extent the
more frequent enforcement and the more stringent punishment of violators
may tend to serve this objective as well as its more direct in terrorem purposes,
72
especially where cases are selected for enforcement with this end in view.
Whether a governmentally mounted campaign should be employed as well
to give widespread publicity to successful convictions and to shape the public

conscience in other ways may be questioned from various viewpoints, but it
surely would be consistent with the basic strategy of using criminal sanctions
in these areas.
How effective a campaign of selected prosecutions and attendant publicity

would prove in creating a changed moral climate is problematical. Certainly
one can not confidently deny that the spectacle of frequent conviction and
severe punishment may play a role in molding the community's attitudes
toward the conduct in question. Experience offers uncertain guidance. Tax
evasion has a history that provides some support. We have come a considerable distance, though not all the way, 73 from the day when an English judge
could observe from the bench, "there is not behind taxing laws, as there is
behind laws against crime, an independent moral obligation." 74 The change
was accompanied in this country by a gradual tightening of the criminal
sanction. In 1924 tax evasion was upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony
and maximum imprisonment raised from one to five years; 75 reforms in 1952
converted the criminal prosecution from a tax recovery device and weapon
against the professional racketeer to a means of general deterrence of tax
evasion by widespread and selected enforcement against all levels of violators. 76 While the tax evasion prosecution is still something of a special case,
the record of successful prosecution has become genuinely impressive and the
72 Cf. OPA Manual, quoted by DESSiON, CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC

ORDEm 200 (1948): "One of the most difficult problems in this field is to combat the attitude,
so prevalent in this country, that the criminal laws are made for the criminal classes and
do not apply to respectable people. This attitude is clearly incompatible with enforcing
general compliance on the part of the consumers. Meeting it calls for the judicious and
telling selection of violations by average people in the various economic and social strata
of society."

73 Congressman Thomas J. Lane of Massachusetts was convicted and imprisoned for
tax evasion. He was renominated and re-elected to the House the next fall. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17,1962, p. 23, col. 5. But having regard to Mayor Curley's experiences, Massachusetts
may be a rather special case.
7

4 See MANNHEIM, CRnIMNAL JusIcE AND SociAL RECONsTRUCTION 146 (1946).

75 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1017, 43 Stat. 343-44.
76
See Murphy, CriminalIncome Tax Evasion, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 317 (1953), for a description of the reforms. As to the effects of the reforms, see Department of Justice News
Release, Jan. 4, 1960, as reported in 6 CCH 1960 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8784; Schmidt,
Current Department ofJustice CriminalIncome Tax Policies, 38 TAxEs 293, 299 (1960).
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tax evasion conviction a sanction of some consequence. 77 Experience such as
this, however, gives little more than support for the plainly plausible assumption that criminal enforcement may play some part. One can not be sure of
the extent to which other factors, not necessarily present in areas other than
tax, created the conditions for optimum use of the criminal sanction as a
moralizing weapon, or indeed, of the extent to which other influences rather
than, or in addition to, the criminal sanction, produced the changed climate.
The caution is further indicated (though, of course, not demonstrated) by less
successful experiences in attempting to deal through the criminal law with
behavior that did not attract any substantial degree of reprobatory unanimity,
such as prohibition or gambling. At all events, Mannheim's caveat is a useful
one: "It is only in a Soviet state and through a legal system on the lines of the
Soviet penal code, which deliberately uses the political weapon of criminal
prosecution to shape the economic system according to its ideology, that old
78
traditions of such strength can be comparatively quickly destroyed."
I
I have reserved for last those issues and concerns that arise out of goals
other than the effectiveness of the criminal sanction in achieving compliance.
Those which most prominently compete for consideration are: first, the sentiment of fundamental fairness-justice, in a word; and second, the retention
of the vitality of the criminal law in its traditional sphere of application. They
come into play in connection with two aspects of the use of the criminal law
to enforce economic regulatory laws; namely, the loosening of minimum
requirements for culpability in the cause of enforcement efficiency, and the
criminalizing and punishing of behavior that does not generally attract the
sentiment of moral reprobation.
A. Requirements of Culpability
At several points attention has been called to the obstacles to effective
prosecution created by certain conventional requirements of the criminal law;
for example, the requirement of specificity in defining the prohibited conduct
and the requirement of minimum conditions of accountability in holding per77
See Department of Justice News Release, supra note 76, in which it is stated that "in
the first 20 years of the [Tax] Division's existence (1933 to 1952), the Division prosecuted
successfully 2,900 persons. In the past seven years (1953 to 1959) the Division convicted

4,344 persons for tax fraud....

"[O]f the 541 cases disposed of by trial or plea, 497, or 92%, resulted in convictions.
[And] ...36% of all persons convicted of income tax fraud in fiscal 1959 received prison
sentences. The average sentence was approximately fifteen months per person. In fiscal 1958,
31% of those convicted received jail terms which averaged approximately twelve months
per person. Total fines ... were also more substantial in fiscal 1959, amounting to about
$2.2 million as against $2.0 million in fiscal 1958 and $1.5 million in fiscal 1957."
78 MANNBm, op. cit. supra note 74, at 166.
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sons responsible for the acts of others. Whatever basis these requirements have
in the area of traditional crime, may they properly be diluted or dispensed
with in the area of economic regulatory crime? The issue is fundamentally the
same as that posed by the use of strict criminal liability, though, interestingly
enough, this appears to have been much less commonly employed in economic regulation than in those controls on business directed to public health
and safety.
The case for the irrelevance of these traditional requirements is reflected
in the observation of a trust-buster of an earlier generation: "The rights of the
accused which are of the utmost importance where liberty of an individual is
in jeopardy, are irrelevant symbols when the real issue is the arrangement
under which corporations in industry compete." 79 In essence the concept is
that the purpose behind the criminal sanction in this area is not penalization,
but regulation. Unlike the area of conventional crime against person and
property where criminalization serves to reassure the community, to express
condemnation and to set in motion a corrective or restraining regime, as well
as to deter proscribed behavior, here the concern is solely with this last factor.
"The problem of responsibility is not the general social phenomenon of
moral delinquency and guilt, but the practical problem of dealing with physical conditions and social or economic practices that are to be controlled." 80
A countervailing consideration commonly adduced in discussions of strict
liability is equally applicable where culpability requirements are otherwise
withdrawn by statutes that do not adequately announce what is prohibited
or that impose varieties of vicarious responsibility. Absent these requirements,
it cannot be said, except in a strictly formal sense, that the actor made a choice
to commit the acts prohibited. Hence, it is said that the law has no deterrent
function to perform, offering no lesson to the actor or to other persons, beyond the Pickwickian instruction that even if he does the best he can, or anyone could, to comply with the law he may nonetheless be punished.81 Yet the
argument does not quite persuade. For it may as plausibly be argued that the
consequence of dispensing with the requirement of proof of culpability eases
the task of the enforcing authorities, rendering successful prosecution more
likely and, through discouraging insistence on trial and simplifying the issues
when trials are held, enhances the efficiency of prosecution. In a word, certainty of conviction is increased. This may readily exert an added deterrent
force upon the actor faced with a choice, since the chances of escaping punish79

Assistant Attorney General Berge, quoted in ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. AN~rusr
Rn. 353 (1955).
8
0 FRuNe, op. cit. supranote 61, at 302. See FRiEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 51, at 198.
81
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, comment at 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955): "In the
absence of minimum culpability, the law has neither a deterrent nor corrective nor an
incapacitative function to perform." Hart, supra note 62, at 422.
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ment for a culpable choice, intentional or negligent, are decreased.8 2 And even
where there is no immediate choice, the effect could sometimes be to influence
persons to arrange their affairs to reduce to a minimum the possibilities of
accidental violation; in short, to exercise extraordinary care. Further, the
persistent use of such laws by legislatures and their strong support by persons
charged with their enforcement makes it dogmatic to insist they can not deter
in these ways.
Closer, perhaps, to the core of the opposition to dispensing with culpability
is the principle that it is morally improper and ultimately unsound and selfdefeating to employ penal sanctions with respect to conduct that does not
warrant the moral condemnation that is implicit, or that should be implicit,
in the concept of a crime.8 3 The issue is whether these considerations are adequately dealt with by the contention that laws dispensing with culpability are
directed to regulation rather than penalization.
The contention plainly proves too much. If the sole concern is a non-reprobative deterrent threat, then it follows that the sanction should be drastic and
certain enough to overcome the motive of economic gain, and not necessarily
that the sanction should be criminal. Civil fines, punitive damages, injunctions, profit divestiture programs or other varieties of non-criminal sanctions
would thus appear to offer equivalent possibilities of enforcing the regulatory
scheme. Indeed, these alternatives might enhance the possibilities, since proof
and evidentiary requirements are more onerous in criminal prosecutions than
in civil suits. The conclusion appears difficult to resist that insistence on the
criminal penalty is attributable to a desire to make use of the unique deterrent
mode of the criminal sanction, the stisp!.of mal blame that it carries. If
so, the argument of regulation rather than penalization turns out in the end
to be only a temporary diversion that does not escape the need to confront
the basic issue: the justice and wisdom of imposing a stigma of moral blame
in the absence of blameworthiness in the actor.
So far as the issue of justice is concerned, once having put the moral
question the footing becomes unsteady. Is the moral difficulty inconsequential,
requiring simply the side-stepping of an otherwise useful symbol that happens
to stand in the way of attaining immediately desirable goals ?84 Does it yield
82 Cf. H. L. A. HART, Murder and the Principlesof Punishment:Englandand the United
States, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 433, 451 (1957): "[Bentham] claims to show that punishment of
such persons as we excuse on such grounds [i.e., those who have committed a crime owing
to their mental condition either temporary (mistake, accident, duress, etc.) or relatively enduring (insanity, infancy)] would be wrong because it would be socially useless ('inefficacious') whereas he only shows that the threat of punishment would be ineffective so far as

such persons are concerned. Their actual punishment might well be 'useful' in Benthamite
terms because, if we admit such excuses, crime may be committed in the hope (surely sometimes realized) that a false plea of mistake, accident, or mental aberration might succeed."
(Emphasis in original.)
83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04, comment at 8 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
84
See ARNOLD, SYMBoLS OF GovmueAENTrpassim (1935).
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to a pragmatic evaluation in terms of an estimate of the soundness of departing
from principle to some degree in particular cases in order to attain goals of
greater consequence?8s Does it present an insuperable objection entailing
commitment to values of such profundity that compromise is unthinkable?86
For present purposes it is perhaps enough to put the questions, though three
points may be suggested. First, the starkness of the moral issue is to some
degree assuaged by regarding laws dispensing with culpability as empowering
enforcement officials to use their discretion to select for prosecution those
who have in their judgment acted culpably. Plainly, however, the issue is not
escaped since it remains to justify dispensing with the safeguards of trial on
this single and crucial issue.87 Second, the recognition of the moral impasse
does not necessarily require agreement that the criminal law should use its
weapons for the purpose of fixing moral obloquy upon transgressors. It is
sufficient that it is broadly characteristic of the way criminal conviction operates in our society. Third, and in consequence, the moral difficulty exists only
so long as and to the extent that criminal conviction retains its aura of moral
condemnation. The impasse lessens to the extent that the element of blame
and punishment is replaced by a conception of the criminal process as a means
of social improvement through a program of morally neutral rehabilitation
and regulation.88 (Though such a development has important implications
which I mean to return to shortly.)
Concerning the issue of ultimate wisdom, the point frequently made respecting strict liability is equally applicable to the dilution of these aspects
of culpability typically at issue in economic regulatory legislation. The dilution
is not readily confined within the narrow area for which it was designed, but
tends to overflow into the main body of conventional crimes. The distinction
between offenses that regulate and those that penalize in the traditional sense
proves inadequate to divide the waters. For example, traditional concepts of
liability in the main body of criminal law tend to receive a new and diluted
85 Holmes believed

that the objective standard of criminal liability which disregards the

personal peculiarities of the actor demonstrates that the existence of moral wrong is not
a condition of punishment. HoLMES, Tim COMMON LAW 45 (1923). He found support for
this in the proposition that, "no society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence." Id. at 43. Cf. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal
Law, 12 STAN. L. Rnv. 731, 739 (1960).
86 Hart, supra note 62, at 424: "In its conventional and traditional applications, a criminal conviction carries with it an ineradicable connotation of moral condemnation and personal guilt. Society makes an essentially parasitic, and hence illegitimate, use of this instrument when it uses it as a means of deterrence (or compulsion) of conduct which is morally
neutral."

87 Ibid.
88 "As the concept of punishment wanes in importance, the sphere of offenses not requiring the criminal intent will widen." Million, Limitations on the Enforceability of Criminal
Sanctions, 28 GEO. LJ. 620, 627 (1940).
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form when construed as part of a regulatory statute.8 9 Moreover, the habituation of courts and legislatures to crimes dispensing with culpability in the

regulatory area may readily dull legislative and judicial sensitivity to the departures from minimum culpability requirements already fixed in the main
body of the criminal law. 90 This expansion of criminality without culpability
in statutory offenses and convictions, and its spread and solidification in the
general criminal law heightens the moral difficulty. As the area expands and
deepens it becomes necessary at some point to face the issue as entailing a
judgment on the abandonment of principle rather than one on the wisdom of

utilitarian compromise for a larger good. Moreover, the risks entailed in
depreciating the impact of condemnation in a criminal conviction become
greater to the extent that conviction without culpability becomes more com-

mon and pervasive. To the extent that the crucial distinguishing factor of the
criminal sanction is "the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition," 91 and to the extent that this charac-

teristic contributes substantially to its effectiveness in influencing compliance
with proscribed norms, the proliferation of convictions without grounds for
condemnation tends in the long run to impair the identity of the criminal
sanction and its ultimate effectiveness as a preventive sanction, both in the
2
area of economic crimes and in the areas of its traditional application.9
B. The Criminalizationof Morally Neutral Conduct
But let it be assumed that the traditional grounds of culpability have been
adhered to so that the defendant can fairly be held accountable for a choice
to violate the economic prohibition. May there be costs, even so, in terms of

principle and other goals, in employing the criminal sanction where the viola89 Consider, for example, the dilution of the requirement of an agreement in conspiracies
under the antitrust law, in which such evidence of agreement as conscious parallelism is
sometimes made substantively sufficient. See Dunn, Conscious ParallelismRe-examined, 35
B.U.L. Rv. 225 (1955). See also Developments in the Law, Criminal Conspiracy,72 HARV.
L. REv. 922, 934 (1959): "Mending to undermine the strict rule that agreement must be
proved is the existence of what are perhaps more liberal requirements in antitrust cases,
which, although they may be justified in that area, are ever likely to be extended to the
general law of conspiracy." A similar dilution attributable as well, at least in part, to Sherman Act cases, has occurred in connection with the requirement in conspiracy of a specific
intent to violate the law. Compare United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913), with Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 747 (2d Cir. 1918), cert.
denied,246 U.S. 662 (1918), and State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939). See Note,
62 HAgv. L. REv. 276, 281-82 (1948).
90 For example, the felony-murder rule, the rule with respect to aggressive behavior
justified on grounds of the defense of another, bigamy and statutory rape. See Packer, Mens
Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 140.
91
Hart, supra note 62, at 404.
92 Cf. WILLLAs, CRIMrNAL LAW 259 (2d ed. 1961): "To make a practice of branding
people as criminals who are without moral fault tends to weaken respect for the law and
the social condemnation of those who break it. 'When it becomes respectable to be convicted, the vitality of the criminal law has been sapped."'
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five behavior does not attract in the community the moral disapprobation
associated with a criminal conviction? How different and how similar are the
considerations involved in dispensing with culpability? The question is the
obverse of an aspect of the relation between criminal law and morals which
has been much considered-the use of the criminal law to prohibit and condemn behavior that is widely (either actually or formally) viewed as morally
reprehensible, where secular interests, in the sense of concerns beyond the
immorality of individuals, do not exist.93 Here the issue is the use of the
criminal sanction to prohibit and condemn behavior that threatens secular
interests, but that is not regarded as fundamentally and inherently wrong.
The central consequence of diluting or eliminating requirements of culpability is, as suggested, the criminalization and punishment of persons who
cannot be said to warrant the condemnation thereby imported. It is this
consequence that gives rise to the hard question of principle and practical
consequences. In a sense a similar consequence follows from punishing conduct that is not itself blameworthy, even when culpably engaged in: Persons
are stigmatized with conviction for conduct not regarded as deserving the
moral stigma. The problem of principle, however, is of considerably smaller
dimension, since the choice to act in defiance of the criminal prohibition may
be regarded as in some measure furnishing an independently adequate ground
for condemnation. (Yet it is necessary to add that the ground exists only in
cases where the culpability requirements are extended to include knowledge
or culpable disregard of the existence of the prohibition, an extension only
occasionally made in regulatory legislation.94)
The danger of debilitating the moral impact of the criminal conviction and
hence decreasing the overall effectiveness of the criminal law can not as readily
be put aside. As Professor Henry Hart has noted, "the criminal law always
loses face if things are declared to be crimes which people believe they ought
to be free to do, even wilfully."95 It may be mitigated to a degree by maintaining a proper proportion in the punishment authorized for various offenses in
accordance with the moral culpability of the behavior. The limitations of such
a strategy are, first, that there is always a strong pressure to raise authorized
penalties when violations become widespread or conspicuous, and second,
that there is an irreducible minimum in the moral condemnation comported
93

See the debate between Lord Devlin and Professor H. L. A. Hart in DVLIN, Tnm ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959) and HART, LAW, LIERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
94
See Hart, supra note 62, at 418. Precisely such a requirement has been incorporated
into a variety of German regulatory laws. See Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz (Code of Economic
Crimes) of 1954 § 6. Section 6(1) reads: "A person who in non-culpable error about the
existence or the applicability of a statutory provision believed his conduct was lawful may
not be punished." Section 6(2) states: "Where the person's error is a culpable one, the
punishment may be mitigated." Similar provisions appear in § 12 of the Ordungswidrigkeitgesetz (Code of Regulatory Violations) of 1952.
95
Supra note 62, at 418 n.42.
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by conviction of crime. Such considerations have led one observer to "decry
the trend toward an increasingly undiscriminating employment of this branch
of the law, and to repudiate the suggestion that criminal law should be applied
more extensively in the areas of ordinary economic relationships." 96
It may of course be answered that the conviction of violators of laws of
this character serves as a means of moral instruction to the community; in
short, that the onus of conviction is transferred to the behavior prohibited.
That there will be a transference would appear quite likely. But that it should
necessarily or generally be expected to involve imparting moral onus to the
behavior rather than moral indifference to the conviction is considerably less
so. The more widely the criminal conviction is used for this purpose, and the
less clear the immorality of the behavior so sanctioned, the more likely would
it appear that the criminal conviction will not only fail to attain the immediate
purpose of its use but will degenerate in effectiveness for other purposes
as well.
There is another cost not paralleled in the dilution of culpability requirements. The behavior under discussion involves restraints upon the free operation of business without at the same time denying commitment to a free enterprise system. The demarcation of the line between the legitimate, indeed the
affirmatively desirable, and the illegitimate in business conduct is continually
in flux and subject to wide controversy in the community. To say there is
no complete consensus on what business decisions should be regulated and
what left free of regulation is to say what is minimally true. It would not follow from this that a legislature should abstain from enacting such controls as
command a majority. But the appropriateness of the criminal sanction as a
means of enforcing the imposed control is another matter. I have already suggested that the criminal remedy in this situation tends to be ineffective and
destructive of its overall utility as a sanctioning device. Here the point is different. To the extent it is effective in generating strong moral commitments to
the regulatory regime it supports it has the dangerous potential of introducing
a rigidification of values too soon, of cutting off the debate, or at least restricting the ease of movement to new positions and a new consensus. 97 This seems
to me the wisdom of Professor Allen's caveat that "the function of the criminal
96 TAPPAN, CRMm, Jusica AND CoRREcTioN 15-16 (1960). For a suggestive discussion

of alternative ways of achieving favorable business sentiment, see LANE, THE REGULATION
OF BUSiNESSMEN 118-30 (1954).

97 The danger of the use of the criminal law to destroy a repugnant philosophy is
exemplified in the revealing observation of BARNES & TETERS, NEw HoRizoNs IN CRMI-

NOLOGY 49 (3d ed. 1959): "White collar crime flows from a competitive economy and philosophy that reveres success based almost exclusively on money. The job of the courts of
justice, legislators, and a regenerated public is to wipe out this insidious philosophy before
it is too late." Cf. HoLMES, SPEEc-ms 101 (1913): "As law embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle of ideas and then have translated themselves into action, while there
is still doubt, while opposite convictions still keep a battle front against each other, the time
for law has not come; the notion destined to prevail is not yet entitled to the field."
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law in these areas is not to anticipate but to reflect and implement the con-

sensus already achieved in the community."98
A word in conclusion on lines of legislative'action. The widescale abandonment of the criminal sanction in those areas where its cost is excessive is
as unlikely as it is desirable. Legislative habit and the simple logic of here and
now expediency have a compulsion not to be denied by contemplation of long
range consequences in areas removed from the immediate target of legislative
concern. A more acceptable and hence more fruitful course is the development
of means of reducing the costs of the use of the criminal sanction in economic
regulations, which do not demand that it be abandoned altogether. If such
means exist one would expect they would be found in ways of dealing with
the central fact principally responsible for the predicament, the irreducible
core of condemnation in a criminal conviction. One possible approach is to
institutionalize a system of gradation of convictions, just as systems of grading
punishment have long been a part of the law. There is no adequate basis
for accomplishing this under present law. The distinction between offenses
mala prohibita and mala in se carries something of the flavor, but it is an
informal rather than an institutionalized distinction and lacks any clear meaning. 99 The felony-misdemeanor distinction has an established statutory basis.
However, the categories have largely lost significance in distinguishing degrees
of blameworthiness, some misdemeanors embracing crimes of serious moral
import, and some felonies embracing relatively minor transgressions. Moreover, there is need for a category of offense carrying considerably less weight
than a misdemeanor. The petty offense category which appears in many
statutes is essentially a petty misdemeanor, retaining its label as a crime and
being punishable with imprisonment.100 In those cases in which the label has
been removed, the substance (that is, provision for imprisonment) has not.1 01
The Model Penal Code has attempted to meet the inadequacies of existing
law by adding to its three categories of crime (felonies, misdemeanors and
petty misdemeanors) a separate non-criminal category designated a "violation" 0 2 which is punishable only by a sentence of fine (under 500 dollars or
any higher amount equal to double the pecuniary gain made by the offender) 103
or civil penalty,104 and which does not "give rise to any disability or legal
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense."105 The design of
98 Allen, Offenses Against Property, 339 Annals 57, 76 (1962).
99
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952); Perkins, The Civil Offense,
100 U. PA. L. RPv. 832 (1952).
100 See, e.g., Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
101
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05, comment at 8 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
102 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
103 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03(4), (5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
104 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02(4), (5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
105 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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this proposal "reflects the purpose of the Code to employ penal sanctions only
with respect to conduct warranting the moral condemnation implicit in the
concept of a crime."0 6 Since strict liability even for crimes properly so regarded presents the same problem, the same solution is applied by treating
crimes committed without culpability as "violations."1 07
While novel in American law, the German law has for some years adopted
an approach quite similar to that proposed by the Model Penal Code.105
Separate from a three level classification of crimes, properly so called (Straftat),109 is another category of offense, the "regulatory violation" (Ordnungswidrigkeit)."10 These regulatory violations are not punishable by imprisonment. A fine is the sole available sanction, indeed a fine which bears a special
designation (Geldbusse, literally "monetary repentance") as opposed to the
penal fine (Geldstrafe, literally "monetary punishment")." These fines are not
registered in the punishment registry" 2 and are imposed at the first instance
by the responsible administrative agency" 3 subject to the right of the violator
to object and to be tried in the courts.11 4
The feasibility of using the category of regulatory violation for sanctioning
economic regulation is, of course, the principal issue. Here the German experience may offer some evidence for decision. Unfortunately there appear to
be no empirical studies of the relative effectiveness of its use in Germany. But
to judge from the statute books it is the typical non-civil sanction for economic
misconduct. All antitrust violations,"15 for example, are regulatory violations,
as are violations of other restrictions upon economic behavior such as certain
behavior prohibited by the foreign trade law,"16 laws governing the operation
of loan banks,"i7 laws governing the closing of shops,18 transportation rate
laws,"i 9 and other laws. Particularly suggestive is the strategy used in con106 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04, comment at 8 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
107 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
1081 am indebted to Mr. Kurt G. Siehr, graduate student at The University of Michigan

Law School, for providing indispensable help with the German law.
109 GERMAN PENAL CODE § 1. The classifications are Verbrechen (Felony), Vergehen
(High Misdemeanor) and (bertretung (Petty Misdemeanor).
110
Gesetz iber Ordnungswidrigkeiten of 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1952, Part 1, p. 177).
"I

Id. § 1(1).

11

2Rotberg, Gesetz fiber Ordnungswidrigkeiten 26, 44 (1952).
11
3Gesetz iber Ordnungswidrigkeiten of 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1952, Part I, p. 177)
§ 48.
114 Id. §54.

I's
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen of 1957 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1957, Part I,
p.'1081) §§ 38-41.
116 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz of 1961 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1961, Part I, p. 481) § 33.
117 Gesetz 11ber das Kreditwesen of 1961 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1961, Part I, p. 881) §§ 56-59.
11
Gesetz fiber den Ladenschluss of 1956 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1956, Part I, p. 875) § 25.
119 Personenbeforderungsgesetz of 1961 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1961, PartI, p. 241) § 61(1)(c).
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nection with certain kinds of economic offenses as a means of individualizing
the determination of whether a defendant's behavior is to be treated as a
crime or a regulatory violation. For violations of certain price control laws,
import restrictions and unlawful overcharging,1 20 a legislative determination
of the appropriate category of the offense is withheld in favor of a judicial
determination in each case. The law requires an offense under these laws to
be dealt with as a regulatory violation unless the nature either of the conduct
or of the defendant warrants dealing with it as a crime. It is a crime when
the conduct "by virtue of its scope or consequences is likely to prejudice the
goals of the economic system, especially those of market or price regulations";
or when the defendant is a "repeated or professional violator or acts in culpable selfishness or otherwise irresponsibly, and by his conduct shows that
he lacks respect for the public interest in the protection of the economic system, especially of the market or price regulations."121 With all their vagueness
these provisions suggest a need in any system that employs a non-criminal
category of violation and uses it to deal with economic violations, for a flexible
device whereby violations may, with changed public sentiment and in consideration of the extremity of the circumstances, be raised to the category of
crime.
One can hardly say that this approach through a tertium quid is the clear
answer to the problems of using criminal sanctions to enforce economic
restrictions. There are many imponderables with respect to its effectiveness
both as a preventive and as a means of reducing the costs of an indiscriminate
use of the criminal sanction. On the side of preventive effectiveness, is the
reprobative association of a genuine criminal conviction a needed weapon of
enforcement? Would the semi-criminal category of offense convey enough of
a sense of wrongness to perform its tasks? Can these laws be enforced efficiently enough without such associations? Is the loss of the power to imprison a
substantial loss? Does what is left of the criminal process still provide efficiencies not available in the pure civil remedy? Will the regulatory offense
prove politically acceptable to legislators and administrators as an alternative
to outright criminalization? On the side of reducing costs, how much will it

help that a new label has been created so long as the criminal process is used,
or that imprisonment is not available as a sanction, when in fact it is rarely
used anyway? And finally, is whatever is lost in effectiveness worth what is
gained in other respects? One cannot be dogmatic in answering these questions. But one can, I think, insist that these are the kinds of questions which
must be asked about this alternative as well as others if we are to escape the
limited options inherited from different days in the use of the criminal
sanction.
12o Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz of 1954 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1954, Part I, p. 175), as amended
1958 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1958, Part I, p. 949) §§ 1, 2, 2a.
121

Id. §3.

